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I. INTRODUCTION
"Do I have a Daddy?" the child cried.
"No," the State said, "you were conceived after he died!"'
Twelve years ago this law review published an article suggesting that the
proliferation of new reproductive techniques necessitated a re-examination of
existing legislation.! That article discussed the dearth of regulatory legislation
regarding reproductive procedures such as artificial insemination, surrogate
motherhood, and in vitro fertilization Since that time, more children have been
born via these alternative means of reproduction.4 In response, some additional
legislation has been adopted to deal with the issues presented by these
techniques.' However, many areas have received little, if any, serious delibera-
tion by lawmakers. Meanwhile, the medical procedures continue and children
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1. Abraham J. Heller, Postscript to "Post-Mortem Artificial Insemination: The Issue of
Legitimacy, " 27 Farn. L. Rev. 18, 24 (1995).
2. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for
Legislation, 44 La. L. Rev. 1641 (1984).
3. The only reference in the Louisiana Civil Code or ancillaries to these procedures was a
portion of Louisiana Civil Code article 188, which remains the same today and states in pertinent
part: "[t]he husband also cannot disavow paternity of a child born as the result of artificial
insemination of the mother to which he consented." La. Civ. Code art. 188.
4. According to a report on assisted reproductive technology, there were reported initiations
of 41,209 cycles of assisted reproductive technology treatment, excluding frozen embryo and donor
oocyte cycles, in 1993 alone. Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States and Canada:
1993 Results Generated from the American Society for Reproductive Medicine/Sociery for Assisted
Reproductive Technology Registry, 64 Fertility and Sterility 13 (1995).
The society now lists four facilities in Louisiana which offer in vitro fertilization and other assisted
reproductive technologies: Fertility & Laser Center, Metairie; The Center for Fertility & Advanced
Reproductive Care, Metairie; Fertility Institute of New Orleans, New Orleans; and the Center for
Fertility and Reproductive Health, Shreveport.
5. La. R.S. 9:121-133 (1991), dealing with human embryos, was adopted by 1986 La. Acts
No. 964. La. R.S. 9:2713 (1991), dealing with the nullity of contracts regarding surrogate
motherhood, was adopted by 1987 La. Acts No. 583. La. Civ. Code art. 1474, requiring an unborn
child to be in utero at the time a donation is made, in order to be capable of taking, was added by
1991 La. Acts No. 363. In 1984, House Bill No. 1715 providing procedures and regulations of
artificial insemination was introduced to committee but later withdrawn.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
are born as a result, often raising unresolved questions affecting the rights of
potential6 and existing children.'
One possible reason for the lack of legislation in this area may be that the
issues involved pose questions that are not easily answered. These questions
challenge traditional notions of family, defy established religious and moral
beliefs,8 and make life and legislating generally more complicated. The approach
6. See Hall v. Fertility Institute of New Orleans, 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 71-75.
7. See Hart v. Shalala, No. 94-3944 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1993), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 109-122.
8. The Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§ 2375-2377, states:
Research aimed at reducing human sterility is to be encouraged, on condition that it is
placed "at the service of the human person, of his inalienable rights, and his true and integral
good according to the design and will of God."
Techniques that entail the dissociation of husband and wife, by the intrusion of a person
other than the couple (donation of sperm or ovum, surrogate uterus), are gravely immoral.
These techniques (heterologous artificial insemination and fertilization) infringe the child's
right to be born of a father and mother known to him and bound to each other by marriage.
They betray the spouses' "right to become a father and a mother only through each other."
Techniques involving only the married couple (homologous artificial insemination and
fertilization) are perhaps less reprehensible, yet remain morally unacceptable. They
dissociate the sexual act from the procreative act. The act which brings the child into
existence is no longer an act by which two persons give themselves to one another, but one
that "entrusts the life and identity of the embryo into the power of doctors and biologists and
establishes the domination of technology over the origin and destiny of the human person.
Such a relationship of domination is in itself contrary to the dignity and equality that must
be common to parents and children." "Under the moral aspect procreation is deprived of its
proper perfection when it is not willed as the fruit of the conjugal act, that is to say, of the
specific act of the spouses' union.... Only respect for the link between the meanings of the
conjugal act and respect for the unity of the human being made possible procreation in
conformity with the dignity of the person."
Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1994 (citations omitted). In contrast, Roman Catholic theologian
Charles E. Curran concluded that in vitro fertilization may be acceptable under some circumstances.
Charles E. Curran, In Vitro Fertilization andEmbryo Transfer. From a Perspective of Moral Theology,
Ethics Advisory Board, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Appendix: HEW Support of
Research Involving Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer § 4, at 7 (1979) (hereinafter
EAB]. Offering a Protestant viewpoint, Stanley Hauerwas found no "direct connection between
theological beliefs and the question of the permissibility or impermissibility of in vitro fertilization," but
neither encouraged nor prohibited it. Stanley Hauerwas, Theological Reflections on In Vitro
Fertilization, EAB § 5, at 3, 18. Islamic scholar Ehtishamul Haque Thanva called the procedure "a
defiance of the laws of nature." Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization & Embryo Transfer:
Fertile Areas for Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 973, 980 (1982) (quoting West, Associated Press Release
(International), July 22, 1979, London). Rabbi Seymour Siegel, professor of ethics at Manhattan's
Jewish Theological Seminary, compared efforts to have children by whatever means to obeying God's
commandment to have children. Lorio, supra, at 980 n.59. "When nature does not permit conception,
it is desirable to try to outwit nature. The Talmud teaches that God desires man's cooperation." Id. See
also Orthodox theologian Stanley S. Harakas' article in which the author stated:
Not only does the issue of "test tube babies" have important moral dimensions for the
Orthodox, but a whole literature exists regarding this practice of general religious as well as
non-religious interest.... At every stage of this process there are moral issues. Is it right
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of ignoring the techniques and hoping that the related issues will go away is not
only unrealistic,9 but callous to the interests of the innocent children born as a
result." Another possible approach is to legislatively prohibit or severely restrict
the use of the new methods, thus hoping to alleviate some of the more challenging
issues raised." Some difficulties, however, may arise as a result of this approach.
Deciding what and how to prohibit or restrict such intimate activity is particularly
problematic in our heterogeneous culture.' Additionally, the effectiveness of
legislating on such private issues, which depends in large part on the compliance
of individuals, may be idealistic at best. Even assuming an agreement to restrictive
legislation, however, does not disspell the possible constitutional ramifications of
regulating procreation which may preclude this type of legislation altogether."
Finally, even with restrictive legislation, people will continue to avail themselves
of the new procedures and some innocent children will undoubtedly be born into
a legal limbo.
Inheritance issues offer an additional dimension to the dilemma. This article
will focus on three areas of particular significance to the distribution of estates:
filiation of children of assisted conception, rights regarding authority over gametes
and embryos, and capacity of inheritance by posthumously conceived or implanted
children. Setting some legal boundaries regarding these matters will not only make
life easier for those who avail themselves of the new techniques as they plan their
estates, but will also define expectations for other heirs whose portions may be
affected and for third parties who have interests in the stability of land titles.
in the first place to intervene in a mechanical fashion in this most human of experiences, the
conception of a child, in effect divorcing the sexual union of parents-to-be from "baby
making?"
Stanley S. Harakas, The Orthodox Church: 455 Questions and Answers 170 (1987).
9. As noted in the Prefatory Note of the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception
Act, "Once out, the genie will never return to the bottle." Unif. Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act, 9B U.L.A. 186 (Supp. 1996) [hereinafter USCCA].
10. An analogy may be drawn to the rights of illegitimate children. Although many may regard
procreation outside of marriage as morally reprehensible, denying rights to the resulting children may
be equally objectionable. When Louisiana laws regarding illegitimates were among the most
restrictive in the nation, its illegitimacy rates were among the highest. See Kathryn Venturatos Lorio,
Succession Rights ofIllegitlmates in Louisiana, 24 Loy. L. Rev. 1, 2 n.13 (1978). Additionally, laws
denying rights to illegitimate children have not been shown to deter the actions of the parents.
11. See generally Christi D. Ahnen, Comment, Disputes Over Frozen Embryos: Who Wins, Who
Loses, & How Do We Decide?-An Analysis of Davis v. Davis, York v. Jones, & State Statutes
Affecting Reproductive Choices. 24 Creighton L. Rev. 1299 (1991); Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia
LeBris, Recent Advances in Medically Assisted Conception: Legal Ethical & Social Issues, 17 Am.
J.L. & Med. 329 (1991); Dan Fabricant, International Law Revisited: Davis v. Davis & the Need
for Coherent Policy on the Status of the Embryo, 6 Conn. J. Int'l L. 173 (1990).
12. In countries which are more homologous, sharing culture, religion, and tradition, a
consensus is often easier to achieve. However, in our "melting pot" society, such agreement is often
harder to reach. See Knoppers & LeBris, supra note 11, at 333.
13. For a discussion of the constitutional limits of legislating with regard to alternative means
of reproduction, see John A. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom & the New Reproductive
Technologies 35-40 (1994); Lori B. Andrews, New Conceptions 153-157 (1984).
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II. FILIATION
A. Artificial Insemination
Artificial insemination is one of the oldest"4 and most common 5 forms
of alternative reproduction. This procedure involves the introduction of semen,
without sexual intercourse, into the woman's reproductive tract for the purpose
of procreation."'
When a married woman is inseminated with her husband's sperm, the
process is referred to as artificial insemination husband or A.I.H. 7 Usually,
because the husband's sperm is used to inseminate his own wife with hopes of
creating a child of the marriage, this procedure raises no problems of filiation.
Problems of filiation may arise, however, if artificial insemination donor or
A.I.D. is used.'8 This procedure involves the donation of semen by a donor,
rather than by the husband of the mother. Different problems may be presented
depending on whether or not the woman is married at the time, and whether or
not her husband has consented to the procedure. Other than an obvious intent
to create a child, it is not always clear whether the child is intended by one or
both gamete providers to be a child of the marriage. Additionally, in the case
of an unmarried woman, it may be unclear what the sperm donor's role is
contemplated to be.
14. The first reported artificial insemination of humans was performed by the English surgeon
John Hunter in 1790. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. Fain. L. 331
(1980) (citing Wilfred J. Finegold, Artificial Insemination 6 (2d ed. 1976)), although artificial
insemination with animals may date back to as early as 1322 when Arab sheiks inseminated their
enemies' mares with sperm of inferior stallions. Laura D. Heard, Comment, A Time to be Born, A
Time to Die: Alternative Reproduction and Texas Probate Law, 17 St. Mary's L.J. 927, 932 n.24
(1986) (citing George P. Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law,
67 Mich. L. Rev. 121, 128 (1968)). It was not until 1866 that Dr. Marion Simms successfully
inseminated a woman in the United States. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow
and the Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, I J.L. & Health 229, 234 (1986-87).
15. One estimate is that 170,000 women in the United States are artificially inseminated with
donated sperm each year, and that as many as 65,000 children a year are born as a result. Press
Conference Statement of Kathryn Kolbert, Vice President, The Center for Reproductive Law and
Policy, New Orleans, La. (Dec. 12, 1994) (on file with the Louisiana Law Review).
16. The semen may be placed into the vagina, cervical canal or directly into the uterus.
Christine A. Djalleta, Comment, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments to the
Uniform Probate Code In the Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67 Temp. L. Rev. 335 (1994).
17. This process is used when the husband is either unable to have sexual intercourse, or has
a very low sperm count. Semen samples may be collected, frozen, and aggregated to enlarge the
count. Alternatively, the sperm may be inserted closer to the egg, reducing the distance necessary
for traveling to the egg. Lorio, supra note 2, at 1643-44.
18. Another process, also raising legal issues of filiation, uses a mixture of the sperm of the
woman's husband and the sperm of a donor. This method is used when the husband has a low sperm
count, or has slow sperm or otherwise inferior sperm, but there is a possibility that one of his sperm
could result in a pregnancy. By mixing the husband's sperm with that of a donor, the possibilities
of achieving a pregnancy are enhanced. Lorio, supra note 2, at 1643-44 n.20.
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The Louisiana Civil Code deals with artificial insemination in a limited way
through its provision dealing with disavowal. Article 188 states in pertinent part
that "the husband ... cannot disavow a child born as the result of artificial
insemination of the mother to which he consented." Thus, there is an expressed
legislative intent to regard the mother's husband as the father of any child
resulting from donor insemination consented to by the husband. The policy is
in the child's best interest, insuring a right to-demand support during the life of
the husband,' 9 an intestate portion after the death of the husband,2" and
possibly even a forced portion2' of the husband's estate at death.2
The problem is that Article 188 does not go far enough. Although stated in
the negative, precluding disavowal, it imposes a positive relationship between the
husband and the child. However, this article is incomplete in at least two
respects. First, it does not elaborate on what is necessary to constitute consent
and therein lies the potential for litigation.23 Of the states having laws
regarding artificial insemination, ' some require written consent of the husband
and wife as does the Uniform Parentage Act.2" Others require the written
consent of the husband only.26 However, even where consent is required in
writing, courts have not imposed the requirement where to do so would deny the
19. La. Civ. Code art. 227.
20. La. Civ. Code art. 888.
21. La. Civ. Code arts. 1493-1495.
22. This will accommodate most cases of artificial insemination since 92% of the requests for
that procedure are from married women. Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child Relationship
in An Age of Reproductive Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 Real Property, Probate &
Trust Journal 55 (1994).
23. With regard to inheritance, the possibility of litigation increases as the number of potential
decedent fathers increases. Since-the use of this procedure became common in the fifties with the
discovery that adding a small amount of glycerol before freezing sperm resulted in enhancing the
chances of sperm survival, the time is "ripe" for litigation as the involved husbands approach the end
of life. See Lori B. Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of New Reproduction Technologies, 70
A.B.A. J. 50, 53 (Aug. 1984); Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 14, at 234; Heard, supra note 14,
at 929-30.
24. See generally Lorio, supra note 2, at 1645-47.
25. The Uniform Parentage Act of 1973, § 5(a) provides:
The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by him and his wife. The physician
shall certify their signatures and the date of the insemination, and file the husband's
consent with the [State Department of Health], where it shall be kept confidential and in
a sealed file. However, the physician's failure to do so does not affect the father and
child relationship. All papers and records pertaining to the insemination, whether part of
the permanent record of a court or of a file held by the supervising physician or
elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause shown.
Unit. Parentage Act § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1996) [hereinafter UPA]. The Uniform
Parentage Act has been adopted by the following states: Alabama, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, Wyoming. Id.
26. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 26-17-21 (1992); Alaska Stat. § 25.20.045 (1992); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3111.37-3111.38 (Anderson 1989); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 § 552 (West 1987).
19961
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
child a father.27 Thus, where it was needed to strike a balance between precise
proof of consent and the best interest of the child, the courts have consistently
favored the latter. One way to achieve this balance may be to adopt the
approach of the Uniform Act for Children of Assisted Conception, which
presumes consent of the husband of the child's gestational mother.28 Presuming
consent by the husband of the mother places responsibility for rebutting the
presumption with the husband, rather than placing that burden on the child. The
responsibility of the husband to affirmatively deny his consent to artificial
insemination is analogous to the first part of Article 188 which provides that a
man who marries a pregnant woman knowing she is pregnant cannot disavow
paternity of a child, absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the mother.
In a state which recognizes the possibility of dual paternity,29 providing that
the husband of the mother is the father of the child is insufficient to fully protect
the child's estate from potential claims of inheritance by the sperm donor, or vice
versa. Louisiana should also provide an affirmative statement that when the
mother of a child born as a result of artificial insemination is married and her
husband has consented to the insemination, the sperm donor is not the legal
father of the child and is released from any rights or obligations regarding the
child. Going further than the release provided to natural parents that relinquish
rights when placing their children for adoption, the artificial insemination statute
should clearly sever any ties of inheritance by, or from, the sperm donor.30
27. See R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (finding husband consented orally to
heterologous insemination); K.B. v. N.B., 811 S.W. 2d 634 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1963 (1992) (finding that although no written consent as required by statute, husband had
ratified procedure by his acts and statements); In re Marriage of Adams, 528 N.E.2d 1075 (II1. App.
3d 1988), rev'd, 551 N.E.2d 635 (Il1. 1990) (finding summary judgment not appropriate to deny child
support where genuine issue of material fact existed beyond lack of husband's written consent).
McAllister cited these cases and concluded that requiring written consent is too harsh in many cases.
McAllister, supra note 22, at 69, 74-76.
28. USCACA § 3 provides that except in the case of surrogate motherhood:
The husband of a woman who bears a child through assisted conception is the father of
the child, notwithstanding a declaration of invalidity or annulment of the marriage
obtained after the assisted conception, unless within two years after learning of the child's
birth he commences an action in which the mother and child are parties and in which it
is determined that he did not consent to the assisted conception.
The reference to the "woman who bears a child," as opposed to simply referring to her as the
"mother" is necessary in order to distinguish the gestational mother from the genetic mother in
instances where the two are separate. See discussion of gestational surrogacy infra text accompany-
ing notes 36-48.
29. Such is the case in Louisiana. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law §
12.33.1 (1996) and Katherine S. Spaht, Family Law in Louisiana § 13.15 (1995).
30. La. Civ. Code art. 214 provides in part:
[U]pon adoption: the blood parent or parents and all other blood relatives of the adopted
person, . . . are relieved of all their legal duties and divested of all of their legal rights
with regard to the adopted person, including the right of inheritance from the adopted
person, and his lawful descendants; and the adopted person and his lawful descendants
are relieved of all of their legal duties and divested of all of their legal rights with regard
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A different situation may exist when the recipient of the sperm is an
unmarried woman. Since there is no husband of the mother, relieving the donor
of responsibility to the child may not be in the child's best interest. One of the
reasons for releasing the donor of responsibilities is to encourage donation.
However, in instances where the child would not have two parents, perhaps that
incentive should not be available.
Another question is raised in instances in which two women intend to serve
as parents of the child. Some would argue that in such a case, the child would
be provided a two parent home and thus the sperm donor should be relieved of
any responsibilities. Others would object to that arrangement as not comporting
with traditional notions of parenthood.' Louisiana should seriously consider
public policy concerns, potential constitutional challenges, and the controversial
nature of this issue.
Most artificial inseminations are performed by physicians and many statutes
dealing with the process require a physician's participation in order for the
statutes to apply. 2 Yet, the procedure is not complicated and may easily be
performed without medical assistance. When the procedure is performed
directly, without a doctor's intervention, the donor is generally known to the
recipient and the rationale for releasing the donor of responsibility again may not
exist.33
to the blood parent or parents and other blood relatives, except rhe right of inheritance
from them.
(Emphasis added). It is suggested that this language be used as a model for the artificial
insemination provision, substituting references to adoption with references to artificial insemination
and specifically omitting the exception as to inheritance:
When a married woman has been artificially inseminated by a donor with the consent
of her husband, the sperm donor and all blood relatives of the sperm donor are relieved
of all their legal duties and divested of all their legal rights with regard to the child born
of such insemination, including the right of inheritance from the child and his lawful
descendants; and the child and his lawful descendants are relieved of all their legal duties
and divested of all their legal rights with regard to the sperm donor and his blood
relatives, including the right of inheritance from them.
See also Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45a-777 (1993).
31. See McAllister, supra note 22, at 76-77, in which the question of lesbian parenthood is
addressed. McAllister's proposed act does not presume that a child is limited to one male and one
female partner, but entertains the possibility of even three female partners, or two males and one
female, as well as other combinations. Id. at 101.
32. The Uniform Parentage Act provision, stating that the semen donor is not the father of the
child born as a result of artificial insemination, applies only when a licensed physician performs the
insemination. UPA § 5.
33. Compare Jhordan C. v. Mary K, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (the California
statute in which a donor was not considered the natural father of the child was found inapplicable
where the sperm had not been provided to a licensed physician) with McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d
239 (Or. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905, 110 S. Ct. 1924 (1989) (Oregon statute which did not
recognize sperm donor as father applicable, despite lack of physician intervention unless donor could
establish agreement with mother, upon which he relied, to the contrary).
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B. Egg Donation
Relatively new on the horizon of new reproductive techniques,34 egg
donation poses some of the most difficult legal questions in the arena of
medically assisted reproductive procedures. This procedure involves the surgical
removal of an egg from one woman and the transfer of the egg to another. The
egg may be fertilized in vitro, outside of the recipient's body. Subsequently, the
resulting embryo is transferred either into the carrier's uterus (in vitro fertiliza-
tion) or into her fallopian tube (Zygote intrafallopian transfer, ZIFT). Alterna-
tively, the egg may be retrieved from the donor and then transferred into the
fallopian tube of the recipient where it is fertilized in vivo (gamete intrafallopian
transfer, GIFT). A much less frequently used procedure involves fertilization
within the egg donor's body and subsequent "lavage," or washing out of the
embryo, followed by transfer to the carrier."
Egg donation is not as frequent an occurrence as sperm donation. This is
partially due to the fact that the removal of the eggs is more intrusive than the
collection of sperm, as well as the fact that eggs, in contrast to sperm, are not
consistently replenished. Each woman is born with a limited supply of eggs.
Absent hormonal treatment, only one egg generally matures each month. Thus,
eggs are a much rarer commodity than sperm. Not surprisingly, only a few
states have any laws dealing with egg donation.36 Louisiana's treatment of the
subject is limited to a prohibition against the sale of human ova which appears
in the "human embryos" provisions." Also, the revised statute stating that
surrogate motherhood contracts are null is limited to situations where the alleged
surrogate is both ovum donor and carrier of the resulting child. Thus, the
surrogate is the biological mother in the complete sense.38
34. The first child created through egg donation was born in 1983. Anne R. Schiff, Solomonic
Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 265,
268 n.12 (1995) (citing Peter Lutjen et al., The Establishment and Maintenance of Pregnancy Using
In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Donation in a Patient with Primary Ovarian Failure, 307 Nature
174 (1984).
35. Schiff, supra note 34, at 270. The lavage method is seldom used due to the risk that the
egg will not be retrieved, resulting in the unwanted pregnancy of the donor. Id.
36. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 742.11(2) & 742.14 (West Supp. 1996); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-18-01
through 14-18-07 (1991 & Supp. 1995); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 554-555 (West Supp. 1996); Tex.
Faro. Code Ann. § 12.03A (West 1996); Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-156 through 20-158 (Michie 1995).
37. La. R.S. 9:122 (1991). It is interesting to note that there is no prohibition against the sale
of human sperm. Such a prohibition would likely result in deterring the contribution of sperm as a
recent survey of sperm donors in the U.S. found that 71% were primarily motivated to donate by the
financial compensation. L.R. Schover et al., The Personality & Motivation of Semen Donors: A
Comparison with Oocyte Donors, 7 Human Reproduction 575 (1992).
38. La. R.S. 9:2713 (1991) provides:
A. A contract for surrogate motherhood as defined herein shall be absolutely null and
shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
B. "Contract for surrogate motherhood" means any agreement whereby a person not
married to the contributor of the sperm agrees for valuable consideration to be
[Vol. 57
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Obviously, sperm donation and egg donation are not analogous. Whereas
in the case of sperm donation, the donor contributes the gamete only, in egg
donation, the genetic contribution is only part of the equation. The severability
of the genetic and gestational components of motherhood jar traditional notions
of this revered institution. The common law presumption that the woman who
gives birth is the legal mother arose at a time long before bifurcated motherhood
was ever contemplated.
Because the process is so new, inheritance disputes have not yet become an
issue. However, the potential for litigation remains a haunting reality and thus
a clear determination of the child's filiation is essential. Either a determination
that the woman who gives birth or, on the other hand, that the woman whose
gamete is used, should be considered the legal mother may be equally arbitrary
depending on the circumstances. Because each woman makes a major
contribution to the child's ultimate existence, a viable claim of motherhood by
each is plausible.
There are a number of different approaches a state could use in legislating
maternity. One is that the law could recognize both women as mothers of the
child. 9 This would certainly meet the expectation of two lesbians who contem-
plate joint motherhood with the intention of raising the resulting child togeth-
er.' None of the states currently having legislation dealing with the subject of
egg donation have used the approach of recognizing dual maternity.4'
Another way to deal with this issue is to start with the traditional presump-
tion that the woman who gives birth to the child is the child's mother.' For
example, if a married woman received a donor's egg, carried the resulting child
to term, and gave birth to the child with the intention of the parties being that the
child would be raised as a child of the marriage, then the notion that the woman
who gives birth is the mother works well. In that case, it is reasonable to
inseminated, to carry any resulting fetus to birth, and then to relinquish to the contributor
of the sperm the custody and all rights and obligations to the child.
39. See Larry Palmer, Who Are the Parents of Biotechnological Children?, 35 Jurimetrics J.
17, 26 (1994). The author suggests this as a possible way to deal with non-inheritance legal disputes.
In some ways, the logic of dual maternity is more compelling than that of dual paternity since both
women have a biological connection to the child.
40. Cf McAllister, supra note 22, at 76. Potential claims from the sperm donor could also
exist and would need to be analyzed in terms of the paternity considerations discussed above.
41. See Daniel S. Strouse, Egg Donation, Motherhood and State Law Reform: A Commentary
on Professor Palmer's Proposals, 35 Jurimetrics J. 31, 44 (1994). See the related footnote 49 which
cites Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 742.11, 742.13-742.17 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-
18-01 to 14-18-07 (1991 & Supp. 1995); Okla. Stat. Ann. fit. 10, §§ 554, 555 (West 1987 & Supp.
1994); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 12.03A, 12.03B (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-
156 to 20-165 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1994).
42. See USCACA § 2 which provides that the birth mother is the legal mother and UPA § 3
which defines the natural mother as the woman who can prove she gave birth to the child. See also
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168-B: 2 (1994).
43. This was the legal approach used to determine custody in a divorce action where the child
was the product of an agreement whereby the husband's sperm joined with a donor's egg to create
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sever legal ties to the egg donor, as is the result under a number of existing state
statutes."
However, the traditional assumption that the birth mother should be
considered the legal mother is unwarranted in the case where a married woman
is unable to carry a child, but is able to provide an egg for fertilization by her
husband's sperm. In this scenario, the genetic mother may seek out a gestational
mother to carry the child to term with the intent that the child be raised as a
child of the marriage. In such a case, the law could indicate that the presump-
tion that the gestational mother is the legal mother could be refuted with strong
evidence, perhaps in writing, that the intention of the parties at the time of
conception was to the contrary. Another way to reach the same result is to
require the genetic mother to take the initiative and formally adopt the child. Of
course, the latter solution would only be feasible if the gestational mother
adhered to her agreement to surrender that child as originally contemplated."
Another possible approach is to start with the presumption that in bifurcated
maternity the genetic mother is the legal mother of the child.' To refute the
presumption, proof, again possibly required in writing, could be submitted to
show a contrary intention of the parties.
In all of these instances involving egg donation, the child is not an accident,
but a well-planned aspiration. Parties who go to such lengths can hardly
complain if the responsibility of committing their intentions to writing is required
of them. In such cases, the intention of the parties as expressed in the written
document should control provided it is in the best interest of the resulting
child.47 In the absence of such expression, the traditional presumption that the
birth mother is the legal mother could be controlling."
a child who it was agreed would be raised by the husband and wife. McDonald v. McDonald, 608
N.Y.S.2d 477. 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
44. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.14 (West Supp. 1996); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 §§ 554-55
(West Supp. 1996).
45. In the case of Johnson v. Calvert, a married couple had entered into an agreement with a
woman who was to carry the embryo, created by the union of the sperm of the husband and the egg of
the wife, to term and give birth to the child who it was contemplated would be raised by the married
couple. When the surrogate changed her mind about surrendering the child and claimed to be the child's
mother, the California Supreme Court held that the genetic mother was the legal mother since the intent
was that the married couple was to raise the child. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 206, cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 374 (1993). Compare the case Belsito v. Clark, in which the wife's egg was joined
with her husband's sperm in vitro and the resulting embryo was carried to term by the wife's sister. 644
N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994). When the married couple brought suit to clarify their status as legal
parents, the County Court of Common Pleas declared the wife to be the natural mother.
46. This was the approach with regard to inheritance issues taken by Professor Palmer in his
proposal to the New York State Bar Association. Palmer, supra note 39, at 26-27.
47. The state may or may not wish to subject all of the considerations to a standard based on
the "best interest of the child." Although the consideration of the "best interest of the child" controls
in custody disputes, the same conditions are not necessarily operative in an inheritance case.
48. Issues of dual maternity, particularly involving lesbian mothers, might also be considered,
since the state allows for dual paternity. See McAllister, supra note 22, at 76-77.
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II. AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER GAMETES AND EMBRYOS FOR POSTHUMOUS
CONCEPTION
As early as 1866, an Italian scientist, Montegazza, who discovered that
sperm could be frozen, suggested that women whose husbands might be killed
at war might want to avail themselves of that discovery. 9 Thus, the idea of
posthumous conception is not new, although the frequency of its use may have
increased.
The legal question raised by this process is whether the law should recognize
the donation of gametes to be used after the death of the donor for conception
of a child whom the donor intends to be considered as the donor's child. To
date, the issue has only arisen with regard to sperm donation since sperm can be
easily frozen for use in later conception. 0 Although the freezing of eggs. is
possible,5" the practice is not perfected and is not yet widely practiced. 2
The query as to whether this procedure should be legally sanctioned is often
posed in terms of questioning the propriety of one transferring his gametes by
selling or donating them. Thus, discussions concerning the nature of gametes as a
form of property have arisen." Many have argued that gametes are entities
subject to disposition and that the donors or persons from whose bodies the gametes
are taken have some dispositional authority over these entities.54 Public policy,
tempered by cultural and moral considerations, however, may limit the ultimate
form of disposition. For example, the state may have an interest in restricting the
use of such gametes to procreation, as opposed to experimentation. However,
within the confines of the boundaries set by society as to proper use, the donor is
the individual with the greatest interest in, and right to, dispose of the sperm.
Cases dealing with defining those boundaries for acceptable use of gametes are
now confronting the legal system. The first of such cases arose in France.
Parpalaix c. CECOS, decided by the French Tribunal de Grand Instance in 1984,
49. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 14, at 234.
50. Healthy children have been born using sperm that has been frozen for over ten years.
Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 14, at 234.
51. The first freezing of an egg was done in mid-1994. Schiff, supra note 34, at 271 n.30.
52. The operative word here is yet. Since medical advances outpace the legal response,
anticipation of the use of frozen eggs is not unrealistic.
53. See Bonnie Steinbock, Sperm as Property, 6 Stan. L & Pol'y Rev. 57 (1995). Ms.
Steinbock argues that this is fundamentally a moral question.
54. See Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization of the American Fertility Society which
states: "[The] concepti are the property of the donors. The donors therefore have the right to decide
at their sole discretion the disposition of these items." American Fertility Society, Ethical Statement
on In Vitro Fertilization, 41 Fertility & Sterility 2 (1984), cited in Barbara Gregoratos, Note, Tempest
in the Laboratory- Medical Research on Spare Embryos from In Vitro Fertilization, 37 Hastings L.J.
977, 991 (1986). See also John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, in which Professor
Robertson states that "[t]he term 'property' merely designates the locus of dispositional control over
the object or matter in question. The scope of that control is a separate issue and will depend upon
what bundle of dispositional rights exist with regard to that object." 69 Ind. L.J. 1027, 1038 (1994).
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dealt with the issue of artificial insemination after the death of the sperm donor."s
When twenty-four year old Alain Parpalaix was undergoing treatment for testicular
cancer, he was advised that the chemotherapy would render him sterile. Thereafter,
he made a deposit of sperm with the Centre d'Etude et de Conservation du Sperm
(CECOS) without leaving any specific instructions for the use of the sperm. At the
time of the deposit, Alain was living with Corinne Richard. Alain's health grew
progressively worse. He died on Christmas day, 1984, two days after he and
Corinne had married.' When Corinne asked CECOS for Alain's sperm deposit,
she was told that the facility had no procedure for returning the deposit to one other
than the depositor and that Corinne could appeal the denial to the Ministry of
Health. When the Ministry postponed reaching a decision on the matter, Corinne
and her in-laws jointly brought the matter to court.5 7
The plaintiffs based their argument on Article 1939 of the French Civil Code
which provided that on the death of the bailor, his heirs had the right to have the
object of the bailment returned to them."5 Thus, their position centered on
regarding the sperm as property which could be inherited. 9 CECOS contended
that the obligation to return the deposit was only to the donor, not to his heirs.
Arguing that sperm was part of the donor's body, CECOS took the position that
sperm was not movable property and thus could not be released to anyone but the
depositor, absent specific instructions from the donor. Additionally, the defendant
argued that the clear intent of the depositor was not manifest because Alain was not
married at the time he made the deposit. Finally, the argument was raised that the
deposit was made only for therapeutic purposes and further use would lead to
possible abuse.'
Ultimately resolving the question in favor of Corinne, the court rejected the
property argument refusing to label sperm as movable property subject to
inheritance, thus finding the French Civil Code articles not controlling." Rather,
55. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 14, at 229.
56. Id. at 229-30.
57. Id. See also Otto Friedrich. A Legal, Moral, Social Nightmare, Time, Sept. 10, 1984, at
54 (discussing the Parpalaix case).
58. The French Civil Code art. 1939 provides:
In case of death of the person who made the bailment, the thing bailed may be returned
only to his heir. If there are several heirs, it must be returned to each one of them for
their share and portion. If the thing bailed is indivisible, the heirs must agree among
themselves in order to receive it.
The French Civil Code 365 (J.H. Crabb trans., rev. ed. 1995). Compare to La. Civ. Code art. 2951,
which provides in pertinent part:
If the person who made the deposit, be deceased, the thing deposited can be restored only
to his heir, if there be several heirs, it must be delivered to each of them for his respective
part and portion, unless the thing deposited be indivisible, in which case they must agree
among themselves.
59. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 14, at 230.
60. Id.
61. Prior to actually entertaining the arguments of the parties, the court reviewed provisions of
the French Civil Code which are quite similar to Louisiana provisions.
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the Tribunal chose to characterize the human sperm as "the seed of life.., tied to
the fundamental liberty of a human being to conceive or not to conceive."62 Since
the disposition of the sperm should be within the donor's domain, the resolution of
the dispute rested in determining the intent of the donor. Analyzing the facts of the
situation and the unified front of the widow and her in-laws, the court ruled that the
sperm be delivered to Corinne's doctor for her use."'
It was not long before a similar case, Hecht v. Kane,( arose in the United
States. Prior to his death by suicide on October 30, 1991, William Kane deposited
fifteen vials of sperm at California Cryobank in Los Angeles. In conjunction with
this deposit, Kane signed a "Specimen Storage Agreement" providing that, in the
event of his death, the sperm bank was to store or release the specimens at the
discretion of the executor of his estate.6' He also authorized the release of his
semen specimens to Deborah Hecht in an "Authorization to Release Specimens"
form." Finally, Kane executed a will naming Hecht as executor and bequeathed
to her the sperm specimen.67 When a dispute arose between Kane's children and
Hecht with regard to the disposition of the sperm, the California court found it
appropriate for the probate court to have jurisdiction over the matter since the
French Civil Code article 315 states:
The presumption of paternity is not applicable to a child born more than three hundred
days after the dissolution of the marriage.
The French Civil Code, supra note 58, at 69. The corresponding Louisiana Civil Code article 185
states:
A child born less than three hundred days after the dissolution of the marriage is
presumed to have been conceived during the marriage. A child born three hundred days
or more after the dissolution of the marriage is not presumed to be the child of the
husband.
See also French Civil Code article 725 which states:
To enter into an inheritance one must necessarily be in existence at the moment of the
opening of the succession. Thus, incapable of inheriting are: I. One who is not yet
conceived; and 2. An infant who is not born viable.
The French Civil Code, supra note 58, at 151. Compare the French article to Louisiana Civil Code
articles 953-954:
Art. 953: In order to be able to inherit, the heir must exist at the moment that the
succession becomes open.
Art. 954: The child in its mother's womb is considered as born for all purposes of its
own interest; it takes all successions opened in its favor since its conception, provided it
be capable of succeeding at the moment of its birth. And the child legitimated by a
marriage posterior to its conception only takes those successions which are opened since
the marriage of the father and mother.
62. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 14, at 232.
63. Id. at 233. Although Corinne Parpalaix was subsequently artificially inseminated with her
deceased husband's sperm, no pregnancy resulted.
64. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1993).
65. Such standard forms are routinely used by sperm banks. Robertson, supra note 54, at 1035.
66. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276. The case also notes that although Hecht was named as
executor in the decedent's will, she was not serving in that capacity at the time of the law suit. It
was also unclear if the release was authorized only during Kane's lifetime or at death also. Id.
67. Id.
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decedent, at the time of his death, had "an interest, in the nature of ownership, to
the extent that he had decision making authority as to the use of his sperm,"6 even
if not governed by the general law of "personal property."69 Speaking to the issue
of intent of the parties as to post-mortem insemination, the appellate court reviewed
the Paraplaix case and concluded that "assuming that both Hecht and decedent
desired to conceive a child using decedent's sperm, real parties fail to establish a
state interest sufficient to justify interference with that decision." 70
A Louisiana court had the opportunity to deal with a similar dispute in the
case of Hall v. Fertility Institute of New Orleans7' when the testamentary
executrix of Barry Hall's succession sought a declaration that frozen semen of
the decedent, deposited with the Fertility Institute, constituted succession
property. Christine St. John intervened alleging ownership pursuant to a formal
donation intervivos executed by the decedent. Similar to Alain Parpalaix, Barry
Hall was advised prior to undergoing chemotherapy that he might wish to
preserve his sperm for use at a later time. Eight months after he made the last
sperm deposit, Hall executed a formal act of donation, purporting to transfer his
interest in his frozen semen to St. John.72 The Fourth Circuit refused to set the
donation aside based on any public policy issue that such posthumous insemina-
tion was contra bonos mores. Rather, the court focused on whether Hall was
fully competent and operating on his own volition when he executed the act of
donation. The court seemed to recognize Hall's dispositional authority over his
semen, stating: "If it is shown at trial that decedent was competent and not
under undue influence at the time the act was passed, the frozen semen is St.
John's property, and she has full rights to its disposition."
73
In its Amicus brief to the court, the New Orleans Association for Women
Attorneys argued that the issue before the court was not whether or not the
frozen sperm was property under Louisiana law, but rather whether or not the
decedent had a sufficient interest in the sperm to permit donation for the purpose
of reproduction.74 Indeed, the question of donation of sperm seems to have
been impliedly answered by the recognition of artificial insemination in the
68. Id. at 283. The trial court dismissed the argument, finding that Kane had no ownership
interest in the sperm once out of his body. The court analogized Kane's deposit of sperm to the
removed spleen of the plaintiff in Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (1990).
Unbeknownst to Moore, tissues from his spleen were used to create a drug for the treatment for
leukemia. When his cells were cultured and later sold by the researchers, Moore sued for conversion,
claiming ownership of the cells. The Supreme Court of California rejected his claim finding that
Moore had no expectation of retaining possession of his cells.
69. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283.
70. Id.
71. 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
72. Id. at 1350.
73. Id. at 1351.
74. Amicus Curiae Brief by the New Orleans Association for Women Attorneys in Support of
Defendant-Appellant at 5, Hall, 647 So. 2d at 1348. See Steinbock, supra note 53, at 59. The author
suggests the Hecht court would have been better served if it had approached the issue in that manner.
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disavowal section of the Civil Code." By referring to the "contributor of the
sperm" in declaring surrogate motherhood contracts unenforceable, the Louisiana
Civil Code ancillary provision also suggests an awareness that sperm is
transferred for purposes of artificial insemination. Similarly, all states which
have laws regarding artificial insemination have already recognized the practice
of transferring sperm.
Thus, the real issue in these cases is not whether or not sperm is property, nor
is it whether or not artificial insemination is an acceptable practice. In all three
cases-Parpalalx, Hecht, and Hall, what is really disturbing to those challenging
the process is that conception of a child will take place after the death of the father.
Policy issues concerning the support of a child without a father and the potential
estate and title disputes that might ensue are the real dilemmas.
Just as sperm may be the object of donation, so too may ova. Although
Louisiana has spoken legislatively to prohibit the sale of ova," there is no existing
prohibition of a donation without compensation for ova. Despite the fact that the
freezing of eggs for later use is not perfected, the possibility of controversy
involving post-mortem conception by use of donated eggs looms in the not too
distant future. In some ways, the policy issues will differ when post-mortem
motherhood is involved, because at least until an artificial womb for gestation is
created," a birth mother would presumably still be contemplated. Although the
likelihood that a woman would consider having her egg be used to create a child
after her death with the anticipation of retaining a legal relationship with the child
seems remote, such a case has already been reported.7s Indeed, the possibilities
are endless and what was implausible only a few years ago has become ordinary
today.
Another twist to this issue is the possibility of implanting frozen embryos
of predeceased gamete donors. The death of two Americans, Mario and Elsa
Rios, in a plane crash in 1983 raised legal questions involving the rights of and
to two frozen embryos created and stored at the Queen Victoria Medical Center
in Australia. 9 The embryos had been conceived using Mrs. Rios's eggs and
the sperm of an unknown donor80 The Rios estate, totaling approximately
75. By barring a consenting husband from disavowing a child born as a result of artificial
insemination of his wife, the Code impliedly recognizes that there has been a transfer of semen.
76. La. R.S. 9:122 (1991) states in pertinent part: "The sale of a human ovum, fertilized human
ovum, or human embryo is expressly prohibited."
77. See ivtiLllister, supra note 22, at 112. McAllister states that some researchers think that
medical science is less than ten years away from growing babies outside of a woman's womb. See
Ruth F. Chadwick. Ethics, Reproduction and Genetic Control 46 (1992). Chadwick discusses
"ectogenesis," development outside of the womb.
78. See Abraham J. Heller's article which speaks of a case in which a widower wanted his
deceased wife's egg to be implanted in his sister in order that a child be born. See Heller, supra note
1.
79. Steinbock, supra note 53, at 77. Barry Brown, Reconciling Property Law with Advances
in Reproductive Science. 6 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 73, 77 (1995).
80. Heard, supra note 14, at 928:
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eight million dollars,"' brought added attention to the case and may have
prompted the ninety women who volunteered to be impregnated with the
embryos.82 Because Mr. and Mrs. Rios left no will and no agreement as to the
disposition of the embryos in the event of their deaths,83 the query was raised
as to who had dispositional authority over the embryos. Additionally, if the
embryos were implanted and born alive, were they heirs to the Rios fortune? In
1984, a special committee commissioned in Australia and known as the Waller
Committee, which had been considering policy relating to the new reproductive
techniques, issued its report." One of the Committee's recommendations was
that embryos such as those belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Rios be destroyed, rather
than implanted." The government of Victoria, however, ordered that the
embryos remain frozen and after the settlement of the Rios estate in California,
it sanctioned implantation. 6 The Rios case is credited with prompting the state
of Victoria to enact its Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act in 1984 which
provided guidelines for future dilemmas.87
Two years later, Louisiana passed a law dealing with human embryos.8 '
Granting the pre-implanted embryos the status of juridical persons, 9 the law
prohibits the sale of human embryos.' Specifically stating that the embryo is
not the property of the physician,9' nor of the gamete donors,92 the relationship
81. Steinbock, supra note 53, at 77. Brown, supra note 79, at 77.
82. Heard, supra note 14, at 928.
83. Fabricant, supra note 11, at 183.
84. Committee to Consider the Social, Ethical & Legal Issues Arising from In Vitro
Fertilization, Report on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilization, Legal Service
Bulletin (Feb. 1985) (hereinafter Waller Committee] (on file with author).
85. Id. §§ 2.14 -2.19. The Committee compared the removal of embryos from storage to the
removal of life support from a terminally ill person. Id.
86. Fabricant, supra note 11, at 183.
87. Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act, Act No. 10,163, §§ 10-18 (Vict., Austl., 1984), cited
in Fabricant, supra note 11, at 184 n.64.
88. La. R.S. 9:121-133 (1991).
89. La. R.S. 9:123 (1991).
90. La. R.S. 9:122 (1991).
91. La. R.S. 9:126 (1991) provides that if the gamete donors do not "express their identity,"
the physician shall be deemed "temporary guardian" of the embryo until adoptive implantation can
occur.
Compare that to the recommendation of the Warnock Report of Great Britain which suggests that
the clinic or storage facility should acquire rights to dispose or use embryos in the absence of a
contrary express agreement with the donors. Warnock Committee, Report of the Committee of
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology § 10.11-15 (1984) [hereinafter Wamock
Committee].
92. La. R.S. 9:126 (1991) states:
An in vitro fertilized human ovum is a biological human being which is not the property
of the physician which acts as an agent of fertilization, or the facility which employs him
or the donors of the sperm and ovum. If the in vitro fertilization patients express their
identity, then their rights as parents as provided under the Louisiana Civil Code will be
preserved. If the in vitro fertilization patients fail to express their identity, then the
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between the donors who have "expressed their identity" and the embryo is
defined as one of parents and child.93
There is an attempt in the Louisiana statute to deal with some inheritance
issues that might arise." However, a number of questions remain unanswered.
The statute provides that viable embryos may not be intentionally destroyed.95
There is a provision, however, allowing renunciation of "parental rights for in
utero implantation" by the gamete donors." In such a case, the embryo would
become "available for adoptive implantation."" In the case of such an
"adoption," any child born would have inheritance rights to the adoptive parents,
while losing inheritance rights to the gamete donors."
It is unclear, however, how the Rios case would have been resolved under
the Louisiana statute since no specific provision is made for the possibility of
gamete donors dying without having renounced their rights for implantation.
Presumably, since viable embryos may not be destroyed under the statute,
adoptive implantation would take place. Apparently, the right to arrange such
an adoption would be left to the physician as temporary guardian.
Yet, if the gamete providers have "expressed their identity," thus preserving
their rights as parents under the Civil Code," and if they "fail to renounce their
physician shall be deemed to be temporary guardian of the in vitro fertilized human ovum
until adoptive implantation can occur. A court in the parish where the in vitro fertilized
ovum is located may appoint a curator, upon motion of the in vitro fertilization patients,
their heirs, or physicians who caused in vitro fertilization to be performed, to protect the
in vitro fertilized human ovum's rights.
Compare the case of York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989), in which the Jones Institute
refused the request of Mr. and Mrs. York to transfer their frozen embryo to another facility.
Analyzing the case in terms of a bailment, the court characterized the embryo as property. A
different resolution was reached by the supreme court of Tennessee in Davis v. Davis, a divorce case
in which the custody of preembryos was at issue. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). Using a theory
that the preembryos should not be considered persons, as implied by the trial court in referring to
them as "children in vitro," and the reasoning suggested by the appellate court that they were not
property, the Supreme Court of Tennessee concluded that the preembryos "occup(ied] an interim
category that entitle[d] them to special respect because of their potential for human life." Id. at 597.
93. Id. at 598.
94. La. R.S. 9:133 (1991).
95. La. R.S. 9:129 (1991).
96. La. R.S. 9:130 (1991).
97. Id. One author notes the inconsistency in this statute with the Louisiana adoption
procedures. See Ahnen, supra note 11, at 1339.1340, pointing out that the procedure for adoption
in Louisiana requires a determination of the "moral and financial fitness" of prospective adoptive
parents whereas no provision for investigating prenatal adoptive parents appears in the human embryo
statute. The language Ahnen refers to appeared in former La. R.S. 9:427. That specific language
is omitted from the current parallel provision in the Children's Code but there is still an implied
fitness to be adoptive parents. La. Ch.C. arts. 1171-1175.
98. This is also inconsistent with the Louisiana laws on adoption which allow the children of
adoption to inherit both from the adoptive parents and from the blood parents. La. Civ. Code art.
214. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
99. La. R.S. 9:126 (1991).
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parental rights," but in fact affirmatively express an intention to become parents
post-mortem, there is nothing prohibiting such behavior. Theoretically, the
gamete providers could specify that a gestational surrogate be found to carry the
embryo to birth."'
Ultimately, the state may wish to articulate a public policy regarding
posthumous conception.'0 ' Although the right to procreate has been deemed
"fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race,"' 2 that right may
not extend to having one's genetic material used after death. 3 As Professor
John Robertson notes:
Posthumous reproduction, however, will share only a few features of
what is valued about reproductive experiences. The individual will not
gestate. She will not rear. While alive, she will not even know she has
reproduced genetically. At most, the person has the present satisfaction
of knowing that genetic reproduction might occur after she has died.
This is an extremely attenuated version of the experiences that usually
make reproduction valuable and important. Indeed, it is so attenuated
that one could argue it is not an important reproductive experience at
all, and should not receive the high respect ordinarily granted core
reproductive experiences when they collide with the interests of
others.'O°
If the state chose to prohibit posthumous reproduction, and assuming such
prohibition was constitutionally permitted,0" the task would not be an easy
one. First, the desire for such a policy suggests itself only when the gamete
providers wish to retain the relationship of parent with the resulting child. If an
anonymous sperm donor were to die prior to the use of his sperm for impregnat-
ing, the reasons for prohibition of the posthumous birth are not operative since
100. If they intended the resulting child to inherit from them, capacity issues arise. Practically,
this scenario could be avoided by physicians requiring as a prerequisite to proceeding with the
treatment that gamete donors agree to the renunciation of parental rights in the event of the death of
the donors. See infra Part IV.
101. In Hall v. Fertility Institute, 647 So. 2d 1348, 1351 (La. 4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit
made the following statement, suggesting it has no public policy objection to the proposed
posthumous insemination:
We find no merit in the Executrix' arguments that the authentic act of donation should
be set aside for reasons of public policy, and reject the notion that St. John's proposed
artificial insemination would be contra bonos mores in this State.
However, in the next sentence, the court seems to be cautioning that its previous statement is dicta:
Similarly, we are not called upon to address the constitutional propriety of artificial
insemination in vitro or in utero, of the question of posthumous reproduction set out with
great erudition in the amicus curiae brief filed herein.
Id.
102. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 1113 (1942).
103. Robertson, supra note 54, at 1031.
104. Id. at 1032.
105. See Robertson, supra note 54, for a thorough analysis of the issues involved.
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the birth of such a child would not result in any loss of inheritance by the
donor's other children. Therefore, because there is no expectation of a legal
relationship to the child, the non-existence of the donor is not relevant.' 6 In
addition, the death of gamete donors who wished to renounce the rights of
implantation of an embryo would present no greater legal problems than if the
same donors were to survive the implantation.
Thus, the prohibition would have to focus on the intent of the donor to
preserve a legal relationship to the resulting child and would merely prohibit the
practice of posthumous reproduction in the very cases where such a relationship
was contemplated by the donors. If both gamete donors are deceased, such a
state policy of prohibition may be more easily rationalized. However, in
instances in which a widow, who would otherwise have had legal access to the
decedent's sperm is denied her "partner of choice," the state may have a more
difficult time showing a compelling reason for restricting her procreative
liberty.'0 7
IV. CAPACITY OF POSTHUMOUSLY REPRODUCED CHILDREN TO INHERIT
Regardless of the state's articulated position on posthumous reproduction,
the rights of any resulting child must be considered. For even if the state were
to prohibit posthumous conception or posthumous implantation of the embryos,
some children may still be born as a result of the techniques. Denying these
children legal rights of inheritance based on the theory that such denial would
deter people from posthumously reproducing is the moral equivalent of denying
illegitimate children inheritance rights in order to deter people from having
children out of wedlock.'08
The case of Hart v. Shalala'° illustrates the roadblock to inheritance that
currently exists for posthumously conceived children in Louisiana. The issue was
raised as an ancillary question in the determination of whether or nor Judith Hart,
106. Thus, the child would not be deprived of any anticipated financial or emotional support
from the donor.
107. Robertson, supra note 54, at 1045.
108. This has been deemed to be an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection. See
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772, 97 S. Ct. 1459, 1466 (1977), in which the Supreme Court
balanced concerns over proving paternity against the child's "total statutory disinheritance." See also
Frederick W. Swaim, Jr. & Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Successions and Donations, Ch. 3 in Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1995). Of course, in the context of posthumous conception, one may argue, in
a "Catch-22" manner, that capacity to inherit must be determined at the time of the parent's death
and since that is before personhood has occurred, no equal protection argument would lie. However,
in the case of embryos where conception, though not implantation, has occurred prior to the death,
La. R.S. 9:121 recognizes these embryos as juridical persons. Thus, when a gamete provider of these
conceived but not yet implanted embryos dies, the embryos would be juridical persons, arguably due
equal protection.
109. No. 94-3944 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1993). For a discussion of the Hart case, see Ellen
Garside, Comment, Posthumous Progeny: A Proposed Resolution to the Dilemma of the
Posthumously Conceived Child, 41 Loy. L. Rev. 713 (1996).
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born to Nancy Hart, widow of Edward Hart, and conceived by gamete
intrafallopian transfer with the sperm of Edward Hart after Edward's death, should
be able to receive Social Security survivors' benefits as Edward's "natural child."
Four years after Edward and Nancy Hart were married, Edward was
diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma of the esophagus and chemotherapy
treatments were prescribed. After learning that the treatments might render him
sterile, Edward decided to deposit his sperm with a sperm bank."0 In a form
provided by the Fertility Institute where the storage was to be made, Edward
directed the physicians to freeze his sperm for later use, assigning all ownership
interest to his wife for her use or disposal as she saw fit."' After the chemo-
therapy, Edward went to Houston for surgery to remove his cancerous tumor.
On the way to Houston, Hart reminded his wife to go forward with the plan to
have a child, even if he died." ' On June 14, 1990, ten days after that discus-
sion, Edward Hart died.
Three months after Edward Hart's death and pursuant to his wishes, his
widow underwent the GIFT process. She became pregnant, giving birth to Judith
Hart on June 4, 1991. All medical and birth records were consistent in naming
Edward Hart as the child's father. Judith was acknowledged as such by friends
and relatives, including Edward's two grown children of a previous marriage.
On December 23, 1993, more than two years after filing a claim on Judith's
behalf for Social Security survivors' benefits, Mrs. Hart was informed by the
Social Security Administration that her request was denied on the basis that
Judith was not the "natural child" of Edward Hart. To be eligible for such
benefits, a child must be a minor and prove dependency on the decedent at the
time of his death." 3  Dependency is presumed in the case of a legitimate
child"' or in the case of a child who would be entitled to inherit personal
property from the insured parent's estate under the intestacy law of the insured's
state of domicile."' A presumption of dependency also exists if the decedent
acknowledged the child in writing, if a court decree recognized the decedent as
the parent of the child, or if the decedent had been ordered to pay child support
to the child." 6 Otherwise a showing must be made that the applicant is the
110. Original Complaint ofNancy Hart at4, Hart v. Shalala, No. 94-3944 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1993).
111. The exact language in the form, signed by Edward Hart and witnessed on April 9. 1990,
was in pertinent part:
In the event I become incapacitated or die, I assign ownership of all vials of frozen sperm
to Nancy Young Hart to either use or dispose of as she/he sees fit.
Original Complaint of Nancy Hart at 4, Hart v. Shatala, No. 94-3944, exhibit I (E.D. La. Dec. 12,
1993) (emphasis added).
112. Original Complaint of Nancy Hart at 5, Hart v. Shalala, No. 94-3944 (E.D. La. 1993).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (1988).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1988).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 416 (h)(2)(A) (1988). "Applicants who according to such [state] law would
have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed
such." Id.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 416 (hX3)(A)(i)(I-II1) (1988).
(Vol. 57
KATHRYN VENTURA TOS LORIO
child of the decedent and was "living with or contributing to the support of the
applicant at the time such applicant's application was filed."'" 7
Because Judith was not conceived at the time of Edward's death, she could
not prove dependency at that time. Since she was born more than three hundred
days after the dissolution by death of the marriage of Edward and Nancy Hart,
she was not presumed to be Edward's legitimate child under Louisiana Civil
Code article 185."' Not having been conceived prior to Edward's death,
Judith had not been acknowledged by Edward in writing, nor had any court
required him to support her. Due to the fact that a year had passed since
Edward's death, it was too late for a filiation action to be brought to attempt to
get a decree by a court that Judith was Edward's child."9
The final possibility was to prove that Judith would have been able to inherit
from Edward under the Louisiana laws of intestacy. The problem here was
Louisiana Civil Code article 953 which requires an heir to "exist at the moment
the succession becomes open."' 20 A child in its mother's womb "is considered
as born" and "takes all successions opened in its favor since conception,"
provided it be born alive.'2' Article 957 states two prerequisites to inheriting:
"one, that the child be conceived at the moment of the opening of the succession;
the other, that the child be born alive.' 22 Since Judith was not conceived at
the time of Edwards death, she lacked capacity to inherit form him under the
Louisiana law of intestacy and thus her dependency was not presumed under the
117. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3XAXii) (1988).
118. La. Civ. Code art. 185 provides:
A child born less than three hundred days after the dissolution of the marriage is presumed
to have been conceived during the marriage. A child born three hundred days or more after
the dissolution of the marriage is not presumed to be the child of the husband.
119. La. Civ. Code art. 209 provides:
A. A child not entitled to legitimate filiation nor filiated by the initiative of the parent
by legitimation or by acknowledgment under Article 203 must prove filiation as to an
alleged living parent by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil proceeding instituted
by the child or on his behalf within the time limit provided in this article.
B. A child not entitled to legitimate filiation nor filiated by the initiative of the parent
by legitimation or by acknowledgment under Article 203 must prove filiation as to an
alleged deceased parent by clear and convincing evidence in a civil proceeding instituted
by the child or on his behalf within the time limit provided in this article.
C. The proceeding required by this article must be brought within one year of the death
of the alleged parent or within nineteen years of the child's birth, whichever first occurs.
This time limitation shall run against all persons, including minors and interdicts. If the
proceeding is not timely instituted, the child may not thereafter establish his filiation,
except for the sole purpose of establishing the right to recover damages under Article
2315. A proceeding for that purpose may be brought within one year of the death of the
alleged parent and may be cumulated with the action to recover damages.
D. The right to bring this proceeding is heritable.
120. La. Civ. Code art. 953. Opening of the succession is either by death or by presumption
of death caused by long absence. La. Civ. Code art. 934.
121. La. Civ. Code art. 954.
122. La. Civ. Code art. 957.
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Social Security law. Absent that presumption, she would have had to show
actual dependency at the time of Edward's death, something which was
impossible due to the fact that she was not yet conceived.
Although some of the coverage of this story in the media criticized
Louisiana's legal system as "antiquated,"'2 3 suggesting that its unique civilian
sources may have been the reason for this perceived injustice, 24 the basic
principles are not very different from those in most other jurisdictions. Both the
common law 25 and the Uniform Probate Code'26 require that a child be
conceived at the time of his father's death in order to be capable of inheriting.
However, there has been some attempt to protect the rights of posthumously-
conceived children in other proposed or adopted legislation. In 1988 the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the
Uniform Act of Children of Assisted Conception and, prompted by the Rios
case,"' included a specific provision to the effect that "an individual who dies
before implantation of any embryo, or before a child is conceived other than
through sexual intercourse, using the individual's egg or sperm, is not a parent
of the resulting child."' 2t Although the provision was "designed primarily to
avoid the problems of intestate succession which could arise if the posthumous
use of a person's genetic material could lead to the deceased being termed a
parent," the accompanying comment to the Act states that "[o]f course, those
who want to explicitly provide for such children in their will may do so.""'
Of the two states that have adopted the USCACA,130 North Dakota and
Virginia, Virginia has recognized a deceased person to be a parent of a posthu-
mously-born child if the process of conception involves the consensual union of
123. Kevin Gray & Anne Maier, Law and Daughter, People Magazine, February 13, 1995, at 52.
124. Janet McConnaughey, Widow not alone in seeking aid for sperm-bank baby, New Orleans
Times-Picayune, Dec. 14, 1994, at B4.
125. Djalleta, supra note 16, at 365.
126. Uniform Probate Code § 2.108 provides:
An individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that time if the
individual lives 120 hours or more after birth.
Section 2.104 provides:
A person who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours is deemed to have predeceased
the decedent for purposes of homestead allowance, exempt property, and intestate
succession, and the decedent's heirs are determined accordingly. If the time of death of
the decedent or of the person who would otherwise be an heir, or the times of death of
both, cannot be determined, and it cannot be established that the person who would
otherwise be an heir has survived the decedent by 120 hours, it is deemed that the person
failed to survive for the required period. This section is not to be applied if its application
would result in a taking of intestate estate by the state under Section 2-105.
127. See Comment to § 4 ofUSCACA.
128. USCACA § 4(b).
129. Comment to § 4 of USCACA. The Uniform Act was designed "primarily to effect the
security and well being of those children born and living in our midst as a result of assisted
conception." USCACA Prefatory Note.
130. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-18-01 to 14-18-07 (1991 & Supp. 1995); Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-156
to 20-165 (Michie 1995).
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a wife's ovum with the sperm of her husband and the child is born within ten
months of the death of either spouse (presumably regardless of the time of actual
conception).' 3' Death of a gamete contributor before in utero implantation will
also not preclude parenthood, whether or not the gamete contributors are married
to each other if "(i) implantation occurs before notice of the death can reasonably
be communicated to the physician performing the procedure or (ii) the person
consents to be a parent in writing executed before the implantation.'932
Louisiana has not followed this trend of legislation aimed at recognition of
children born of new reproductive techniques. In fact, Louisiana is actually
proposing legislation which is more restrictive in its approach with regard to
posthumously born children. Senate Bill Number 1379 of the Regular Session of
1995 included the standard provision that "[a] successor must exist at the death of
the decedent."' 33 It also proposed the passage of a new Article 940 which would
provide that "[a]n unborn child in utero at the death of the decedent and thereafter
born alive shall be considered to exist at the death of the decedent." 34 The
comment to the proposed article states that it reproduces the substance of Article
954 of the Louisiana Code of 1870 and "does not change the law."'" If the
article is meant only to ensure thatimplanted children who are subsequently born
alive may inherit, the statement presents no problem. However, if it is meant to
absolutely preclude inheritance by conceived, but not yet implanted children, the
article may be altering the law. The difficulty is that in its abbreviation of previous
Chapter 5 of Book II, Title I, the proposed revision has omitted articles which
would support the possibility of inheritance by a child conceived before a parent's
death, although not yet implanted in a uterus. Article 957 of the Louisiana Code
of 1870 provides simply that in order to inherit, a child need only show that he was
conceived at the time of his parent's death, and that he was later born alive.'36
Nothing is mentioned about implantation. Perhaps this is because the redactors,
131. Va. Code Ann. § 20-158B provides:
B. Death of spouse.-Any child resulting from the insemination of a wife's ovum using
her husband's sperm, with his consent, is the child of the husband and wife notwithstand-
ing that, during the ten-month period immediately preceding the birth, either party died.
However, any person who dies before in utero implantation of an embryo resulting from
the union of his sperm or her ovum with another gamete, whether or not the other gamete
is that of the person's spouse, is not the parent of any resulting child unless (i)
implantation occurs before notice of the death can reasonably be communicated to the
physician performing the procedure or (ii) the person consents to be a parent in writing
executed before the implantation.
132. Va. Code Ann. § 20-158 B (Michie 1995).
133. S. 1379, 1995 Session art. 939. See Appendix to this Symposium at 57 La. L. Rev. 201.
134. Id. at art. 940.
135. Comment to proposed Article 940. Article 954 of the Louisiana Code of 1870 states in
pertinent part:
The child in its mother's womb is considered as born for all purposes of it own interest;
It takes all successions opened in its favor since its conception, provided it be capable of
succeeding at the moment of its birth.
136. La. Civ. Code art. 957.
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writing the Code before new reproductive techniques were common, did not make
any distinction between fertilization and implantation. Indeed, at that time such
distinctions were not necessary. Today, however, the distinctions are pivotal. For
example, a child conceived, but not implanted in his mother's uterus before the
death of his father, could argue that he was in fact conceived' and was later
born alive. Thus, the child could inherit under Article 957. Arguably, the reference
to being in the mother's womb in Article 954 does not preclude a conceived, but
not yet implanted child from inheriting. Rather, Article 957 merely gives the child
in the womb at the time of the father's death an advantage because that child is
already "considered as born for all purposes of its own interest ... provided it be
capable of succeeding at the moment of its birth."' In contrast, the child that
has not yet been implanted does not enjoy that same presumption of capacity, but
must in fact present further proof of timely conception. When the Code was
written, the redactors contemplated proof such as that provided in the section on
filiation.' However, with today's new techniques, other proof, such as medical
records indicating dates of insemination could also be used to prove conception.
Additionally, to require that a child be in utero in order to be capable of
inheriting or of receiving a donation' eliminates the possibility of inheritance,
not only of posthumously born children, but also of children born as the result of
abdominal pregnancies. Although rare, it is possible for a child to be conceived,
never be implanted in the mother's uterus, but rather in her abdomen and then born
alive. 4 Thus, if the revision was meant to eliminate the possibility of posthu-
mously implanted children inheriting, but not meant to disqualify children born of
abdominal pregnancies, requiring a child to be "in vivo" rather than "in utero"
would have been more appropriate.
Even assuming, however, that an argument could be made under the Code
of 1870 for inheritance by children conceived before their father's death,
although implanted after, there is still a problem with regard to children
137. There are differing definitions of conception: "[T]he onset of pregnancy, marked by
implantation of the blastocyst in the endometrium; the formation of a visible zygote." Dorland's
Illustrated Medical Dictionary (28th ed. 1994); and, "The beginning of pregnancy. As to human
beings, the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable
of survival and maturation under normal conditions." Black's Law Dictionary 289 (6th ed. 1990).
138. La. Civ. Code art. 954.
139. Louisiana Civil Code article 958 specifically refers to the filiation provisions.
140. Such a provision was passed in 1991 as part of the package dealing with capacity to take,
including articles dealing with mental incapacity ad undue influence. 1991 La. Acts No. 363. Article
1474 provides:
To be capable of receiving by donation inter vivos, an unborn child must be in utero at
the time the donation is made. To be capable of receiving by donation mortis causa, an
unborn child must be in utero at the time of the death of the testator. In either case, the
donation, has effect only if the child is born alive.
See discussion of this provision in Swaim & Lorio, supra note 108, § 10.2.
141. See Abdominal Pregnancy, 41 AFP 209 (1990) and Costa et al., Advanced Abdominal
Pregnancy, 46 Obstetrical and Gynecological Survey 515 (1991). See also discussion in Swaim &
Lorio, supra note 108, § 6.2.
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conceived after the father's death. Some may argue that this distinction is
deliberative and that it would be contra bones mores to open the doors of
inheritance to such children. This author submits, however, that the exact
opposite is the case. If the state is truly concerned about the support of children,
allowing these children to inherit the estate of the person responsible for their
existence seems eminently reasonable. Rather than excluding these 6hildren from
receiving property that could be used to ensure they not become wards of the
state, the law should sanction such inheritance. 4 2  Under this reasoning a
biological parent should certainly not be precluded from leaving property by
testament to these children.143
However, allowing such posthumously conceived children to inherit raises
a number of other issues such as actual proof of relationship, intent of the
gamete provider to retain a relationship to the resulting child, and the myriad of
questions regarding the stability of land titles. Any provision proposing
recognition of inheritance rights by these children should accommodate for these
three concerns. Requiring that the persons responsible for the creation of these
children take the initiative to plan for their protection does not seem unduly
burdensome. Most persons contemplating extraordinary methods of conception
have generally given considerable thought to the process. Arguably, they would
welcome a legal mechanism to ensure the security of any resulting children.'"
The following suggestions are submitted as reasonable measures to protect
the rights of these children. First, the problem of proving the biological
relationship between the gamete provider and the posthumously conceived child
could be alleviated by requiring the parent, at the time of depositing genetic
material, to undergo deoxyribonucleic (DNA) testing so the results could be
compared to that of any posthumously born child to establish filiation. ""
Second, to ensure that the parent desired to retain a legal relationship to the
resulting child, specific written indication of intent should be made at the time
of deposit. Third, a time period after the prospective parent's death and within
which birth of the child must take place would protect the interests of other heirs
and third parties as well. 4 "
Although it may be argued that all rights of ownership to an estate should
vest at the time of the decedent's death, there is already precedent to the contrary
in Louisiana. Louisiana Civil Code article 1521 specifically accommodates for
142. See Lisa M. Burkdall, Note, A Dead Man's Tale: Regulating the Right to Bequeath Sperm
in California, 46 Hastings L.J. 875, 904 (1995), where the author suggests that a sperm donor
specifically provide that his testamentary disposition of property be subject to an obligation to support
any posthumously conceived children.
143. Compare to La. Civ. Code art. 1474, supra note 140.
144. It is submitted that one of the reasons such provisions by prospective parents are not made
is that there is no legal framework to guide them in the process.
145. Heller. supra note 1, at 21.
146. For such recommendations, see Garside, supra note 109, and Burkdall, supra note 142, at
19961
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the possibility of suspending the vesting of ownership for ninety days following
the death of the decedent in order to ensure that an heir lives long enough to
enjoy an inheritance. ' 7  Why not provide for a similar time frame within
which a child could be conceived? Donations could be made by the prospective
gamete donor to the subsequently born child, contingent on the birth of the child
within the specified permissible period after the donor's death. Just as in the
case of Milne's Heirs v. Milne's Executors,' 8 in which a donation mortis causa
to a corporation which had not come into existence at the time of the donor's
death was rationalized as "conditional" in nature," 9 the birth of a planned child
could be conditional. In Milne, realizing the "manifest public utility"' of
creating institutions to receive the sizable donation of the testator, the Louisiana
legislature incorporated the entities after the donor's death and deemed the
condition, fulfilled. Likewise, in order to carry out the clear intention of the
decedent and to provide necessary support for the innocent child, the law could
147. La. Civ. Code art. 1521 provides in pertinent part:
The disposition, by which a third person is called to take a gift, the inheritance or the
legacy, in case the donee, the heir, or the legatee does not take it, shall not be considered
a substitution and shall be valid, provided: ... (2) That, with regard to the taking of a
disposition by any heir, legatee, or trust beneficiary, including the legitime of a forced
heir, a testator may impose as a valid suspensive condition that the donee, heir, legatee,
or trust beneficiary must survive the testator for a stipulated period, which period shall not
exceed ninety days after the testator's death, in default of which a third person is called
to take the gift, the inheritance, or the legacy; in such a case the right of the donee, heir,
legatee, or trust beneficiary is in suspense until the survivorship vel non as required is
determined. If the donee, heir, legatee, or trust beneficiary survives as required, he is
considered as having succeeded to the deceased from the moment of his death, and if he
does not survive as required, he is considered as never having received it, and the third
person who is called to take the bequest in default of his survival is considered as having
succeeded to the deceased from the moment of his death. A survivorship condition as to
the legitime of a forced heir shall only be valid if the forced heir dies without descen-
dants, or if he dies with descendants and neither the forced heir nor the descendants
survive the stipulated time.
See also Baten v. Taylor, 386 So. 2d 333 (La. 1979), in which ownership of a legacy was deemed
suspensively conditioned on the legatee's survival for a period of thirty days from the testator's death.
As noted by the court, "[t]he survivorship clause. . . does not suspend seizin of the succession, but
is a valid disposition of ownership subject to suspensive conditions .. ." Id. Compare Max Nathan,
Common Disasters and Common Sense in Louisiana, in which the author recommends a similar
resolution, although seemingly positing his argument in terms of the suspension of seizin. 41 Tul.
L. Rev. 33, 52 (1968).
148. 17 La. 46 (1841).
149. The Milne court stated:
Dispositions of this kind are conditional in their nature and the condition fulfilled by the
creation of the capacities to receive; thus in this case, it was intended, we think, that the
legacies should be delivered to these institutions upon their becoming incorporated; the
implied condition was that they should be rendered capable of receiving and that condition
was fulfilled by the subsequent acts of incorporation.
Milne, 17 La. at 55.
150. Milne, 17 La. at 56.
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deem the condition of birth as fulfillment of the suspensive condition in the case
of posthumously conceived children.'
V. CONCLUSION
As the first "test-tube" baby has come of age,' our legal system has yet
to adequately address the issues raised by the new reproductive technology.
Although posing difficult constitutional and moral dilemmas which challenge our
basic views of humanity, these procedures cannot be ignored and the legal
ramifications need to be addressed. As time passes, the problems become
magnified as gamete donors die and inheritance issues arise.
A first step is a recognition of the need for action. Then, educated
concerning the legal, medical, and ethical ramifications of the processes involved,
lawmakers may formulate policies involving acceptable boundaries and legal
procedures to follow in order to fully protect the interests of the resulting
children of the new procreative technology.
151. The words of the Milne case become particularly poignant when analyzing the difficulties
faced by Judith Hart:
After the strong and positive declaration of Milne with respect to the disposition of his
property, shall a technical objection drawn from provisions of law, not perhaps applicable
to cases of this kind, defeat his purpose?
Id. at 56-57.
152. Louise Brown, the first child born of in vitro fertilization celebrated her eighteenth birthday
on July 25, 1996. 18 Years Ago In Time, Time Magazine, August 5, 1996.
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